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Abstract
Fostering efficiency of distributed supply chains in the Industry 4.0 often bases on IoT-
data analysis and by means of lean- and shopfloor-management. However, trust by
preserving privacy is a precondition: Competing factories will not share data, if, e.g.,
the analysis of the data will reveal business relevant information to competitors. Our
approach is enforcing privacy policies in Industry 4.0 supply chains. These are highly
dynamic and therefore not manageable by ’traditional’ rights-management approaches as
we will stretch in a literature analysis.
To enforce privacy, we analyze two industrial settings and derive general requirements:
(1) Lean- and shopfloor-management and (2) factory access control, both common in
Industry 4.0 supply chains. We further propose a reference architecture for Industry 4.0
supply chains. We introduce the combination of Palladio Component Model (PCM) [23]
and Ensembles [4] in order to analyze and enforce privacy policies in highly dynamic
environments.
Our novel approach paves way for data sharing and global data analyzes in highly
dynamic Industry 4.0 supply chains. It is an important step for efficiency of these supply
chains and therefore one important cornerstone for the success of Industry 4.0.
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1 Introduction
Supply chains in today’s production processes are often highly distributed. Produc-
ers receive intermediate products from multiple suppliers that have multiple suppliers
themselves. Producers reduce their storage capacity in favour of just in time production,
which requires timely delivery of parts and low wastage. At the same time, customers
want to track their customized product during the whole production process until they
receive it. Industry 4.0 supports such scenarios by collecting and exchanging relevant
information.
However, the participants of the supply chain do not want to exchange all information
with all participants. For instance, the supply chain of a producer might contain two
suppliers of the same part. The suppliers are therefore competitors, and they do not want
to share information that gives an advantage to a competitor. Access constraints have
to restrict information exchange. Often, these rules cannot be statically defined because
the context of the information exchange can change dynamically. For instance, the role
of an organization in the supply chain might change from a supplier to a producer, which
requires more information shared with it.
Even if there are approaches to restrict information exchange by access control poli-
cies, they do not consider dynamic context changes that Industry 4.0 settings require.
Additionally, a comprehensive list of requirements and relevant context information of
such scenarios is not available.
To overcome this issue, we elicitate requirements and relevant context information
from real world industrial settings. We do this by defining use cases for a data flow-
based privacy analysis and enforcement in such settings. Additionally, we collect the
state of the art regarding privacy analysis and enforcement approaches and check their
abilities regarding the collected requirements.
The remainder of the paper includes the requirements for trust approaches in Chap-
ter 2 that starts describing the Trust 4.0 reference architecture that guides the descrip-
tion of the two real-world industrial settings; namely, the settings of KPI sharing across
supply chains and entities management within dynamic manufacturing process. Next,
Chapter 3 describes the roles involved in the use cases and a detailed list of use cases that
the Trust 4.0 will selectively tackle. Further, Chapter 4 describes the state of the art
including approaches to confidentiality analysis, access control, enforcement, and data
sensitivity. Finally Chapter 5 summarises the envisioned approach for trust enforcement
to then let Chapter 6 conclude the technical report.
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2 Requirements for Trust Approaches
Before describing the requirements, we specify a reference architecture for privacy pre-
serving information exchange along supply chains. The reference architecture is neces-
sary for specifying a common vocabulary and for describing all interfaces. Afterwards
we describe requirements from real world industrial settings: Lean- and shopfloor-
management as well as physical access control. Both settings apply in a distributed
supply chain.
2.1 Trust 4.0 Reference Architecture
The requirements for trust approaches stem from two settings within the problem do-
main of privacy and trust in Industry 4.0 systems. Figure 2.1 describes the reference
architecture that guides the requirements gathering phase according to two domains:
(1) KPI (Key Performance Indicators) sharing across the entire supply chain within the
context of lean- and shopfloor-management as Section 2.2 explains and (2) the physical
access to buildings for entities management within dynamic manufacturing process as
Section 2.3 describes.
The reference architecture shown in Figure 2.1 exemplifies a supply chain that shares
information related to the local production business processes of each individual factory.
The left-hand side of Figure 2.1 shows the software components in Factory 1 followed
by Factory 2 to the right and multiple other factories that include Factory n. Each of
these factories produces goods and is equipped with sensors that monitor the different
processes involved in the production of those goods and other related business processes
such as logistics or physical access to buildings. The different sensors in a factory feed
the IoT platform through IoT interfaces – typically using communication protocols such
as MQTT or OPC-UA1 – which in turn aggregate the data for the local shopfloor-
management system to show it to their users through its user interface. This helps
users to monitor the status of the system as well as sharing information with other
factories across the supply chain to improve the supply chain management by identifying
weaknesses and opportunities of improvement.
Privacy and trust models govern the access control sub-component that allows or for-
bids the local shopfloor-management system to share data with other factories through
the global shopfloor-management system at the top of Figure 2.1 according to the pri-
vacy of the data to be shared and the trust in the other factories. The local shopfloor
1The Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is a publish-subscribe messaging protocol work-
ing on top of the TCP/IP protocol and following an ISO standard[16]. The OPC Unified Architecture
(OPC UA) is a platform-independent service-oriented architecture delivering a machine to machine
communication protocol for industrial automation[9].
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Figure 2.1: Reference architecture of the problem domain of privacy and trust in Industry
4.0 settings
management system uses its data to derive KPIs. KPIs are the information that this sys-
tem shares with other shopfloor-management systems in other factories according to the
privacy and trust models. If these KPIs are to be shared, the factory queries the global
shopfloor management system that access the appropriate local shopfloor management
systems according to its global access control mechanism that enforces the information
exchange according to the global privacy and trust models.
In the following sections, we describe the requirements originating from the field of
KPI sharing as well as the field of physical access control that uses the sensor data to
decide about physical access and uses the physical location of people to decide about
data sharing.
2.2 KPI Sharing Across Supply Chains
Lean- and shopfloor-management systems, such as ValueStreamer R©2, share KPIs and
other data across supply chains (SC) according to the context of the data sharing op-
eration as well as depending on the particular context of the business process involved
in sharing such as the roles of the stakeholders involved, the time and date of the data
sharing, the participant SC entity and its members, the specific time window for data
sharing, the sharing location, or the provenance of the data across SC.
An example of organizations sharing KPIs across their supply chain include a car
2ValueStreamerR© is a commercial product by the companies CAS software AG — co-authors of this
paper — and Staufen AG. ValueStreamerR© is a shop floor management system that delivers lean
management principles and data sharing across the entire supply chain[5].
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manufacturer as the central element of this supply chain reacting to the production is-
sues of its multiple suppliers delivering gasoline systems, chassis system controls, brakes,
tires, electrical systems, power-train control, and many other elements. The car manu-
facturer recognises its sourcing issues by identifying production problems of its suppliers
according to their production machine error rates. Sharing these machine error rates
data might entail privacy violations such as when these data are shared with compet-
ing organizations or if they contain personal data and are shared with a SC member
that should not be allowed access. On the one hand the knowledge of error rates allows
stakeholders to monitor, predict, and optimize the production process while on the other
hand the error rates constitute sensitive information that have to be shared according
to a set of privacy policies. The following functional and non-functional requirements
try to address this dichotomy while enforcing appropriate levels of privacy and fostering
trust.
2.2.1 Functional Requirements for KPI Sharing
The following functional requirements describe the necessary functionality for IoT data-
driven and privacy-preserving lean- and shopfloor-management.
Requirement R1 – Data Sharing across the Entire Supply Chain
Users of lean- and shopfloor-management systems require efficient data exchange, i.e.
KPI exchange, across the SC. The access and distribution of KPIs shall respect their
data privacy level according to the involved stakeholders and the dynamic context of
the data exchange. The data exchange should allow exchanging IoT data internally and
across organisations including the KPIs stemming from the aggregated IoT data.
Requirement R1: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems have to let the user share
data, such as KPIs, across the entire supply chain.
Requirement R2 – Privacy-Concerned Data Sharing
In addition to IoT data presenting no privacy challenges, there exists data with higher
privacy levels such as personal data and data related to business processes. Personal
data include data of employees and their working times in addition to data of suppliers.
As for the business processes data, they could include data about the efficiency of the
system, new developments, and data that might lead to extracting personal information
about employees or data that is valuable for a company and therefore secret. Further, the
system should consider the legal framework affecting the gathering, processing, backing-
up, storage, and distribution of data in addition to how trust could be lost as a result
of not respecting the privacy of these data.
Requirement R2: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data privacy policies via allowing or forbidding data sharing across the supply chain.
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Requirement R2.1 – Privacy-Aware Analytics and Predictions
Data analytics or data-based predictions aggregate different data and KPIs to predict
critical situations, provide decision support, or discover patterns so as to make rec-
ommendations or predictions. However, these algorithms should not be able to reveal
information in a way which conflicts with privacy policies.
Requirement R2.1: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems should be able to enforce
data privacy policies, even in the context of analytics or predictions resulting of the
combination of different data sources and KPIs.
Requirement R2.2 – Respecting the Legal Framework
The protection of the data should respect the particular legal framework. In the Euro-
pean Union, computing systems must respect the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). In other countries, other comparable laws must be respected.
Requirement R2.2: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data sharing privacy policies that respect relevant legal frameworks.
Requirement R2.3 – Privacy Awareness in Business Processes
In accordance with particular processes, data sharing may be allowed or forbidden. The
context of business processes greatly affects how information is shared. For example a
machine maintenance operator will get access to machine only within the context of an
authorised maintenance operation but not be allowed to access those data otherwise.
Requirement R2.3: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data sharing privacy policies with regards to executed business processes.
Requirement R2.4 – Role-Dependent Privacy
Data access depends on the role of the stakeholder trying to access the data. The role
itself might depend on organisational structures, specific context of the process being
executed in that particular time and other factors. For example, the role of stakeholders
involved in a business process as senior managers might give them access to some data
while a machine operator might not be entitled to access them. An exception might
be that for a particular time window and for a machine that requires maintenance the
operator has access to the data in order to maintain the machine. This shows that the
sharing permissions are very dynamic. They evolve over time like in this case or in cases
granting the right to erasure or right to be forgotten.
Requirement R2.4: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data sharing privacy policies with regards to the roles of the participants in the executed
business process.
Requirement R2.5 – Enforcing Privacy along Organisational Structures
Data is shared within organizations across their organizational structures and beyond
organizational structures. Organizational secrets can often be shared with subsidiary
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or holding companies as they pertain to the same organizational structure and are
not allowed to share beyond organizational borders. The organizational context en-
tails whether a stakeholder can exchange particular data according to the role of the
participating organizations. This is challenging in Industry 4.0 ecosystems with roles,
organizations, and the entire SC members and configuration changing rapidly over time.
Requirement R2.5: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data sharing privacy policies with regards to the structure of the organisation sharing the
data.
Requirement R2.6 – Data Sharing according to the Time-Related Context
Time and time-related constraints determine the period during which stakeholders can
exchange particular data and its expiration time. These constraints might depend on
the order of actions within a business process such as the already mentioned example
of procurement in Requirement R2.3. For example, contracts between supply chain
members usually specify confidentiality agreements for a specific period of time defining
what can be shared, how, and with whom. Additionally, some data should be deleted
after a period of time or after this data served the purpose for which it has been collected.
Requirement R2.6: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data sharing privacy policies with regards to the time-related context of the executed
business process.
Requirement R2.7 – Location and Privacy
If a machine operator has physical access to a machine, then the operator might also
have access to the machine data. This might not be allowed, if the same operator does
not have the physical access, e.g. because he/she is at home.
Requirement R2.7: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be able to enforce
data sharing privacy policies with regards to the location-related context.
2.2.2 Non-functional Requirements for KPI Sharing
Non-functional requirements are an important part of the commercial use of privacy-
preserving mechanisms, as they increase the acceptance among the users of the mech-
anisms. The following non-functional requirements have been included. Furthermore,
these requirements are only discussed in the event of major deviations since they must
be taken into account for the scientific investigation, but do not play a central role. This
is a frame of economic exploitation of the approaches to consider more closely.
Requirement NFR1 – Performance
KPI data shared from lean- and shopfloor-management systems should be timely ready
for other systems to build on top of that data. For example, according to the experience
gathered in the span of these and previous projects with regards to the throughput per
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hour, data objects such as related KPIs shared across worldwide supply chains require
to be readily available for other SC stakeholders within 10 minutes.
Lean- and shopfloor-management systems have to take the decision to allow data
access or not within the same timeframe and therefore need a certain performance.
Requirement NFR 1: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall compute privacy-
related mechanisms in less than 5 minutes in a state-of-the-art workstation.
Requirement NFR2 – Platform-independent Architecture
Industry 4.0 settings use sensors from different vendors and potentially proprietary plat-
forms. Users require data and application portability, which entails respecting Industry
4.0 standards while preventing sensitive data reaching unauthorised parties indepen-
dently from which stakeholder implements the interfaces to vendor-specific components.
Requirement NFR 2: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall platform-
independently enforce privacy.
Requirement NFR3 – Secure Communication
Enforcing privacy is difficult without secured communication. Therefore, lean- and
shopfloor-management systems shall deliver secured communication.
Requirement NFR 3: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall share data over
secured protocols.
Requirement NFR 4 – Reliability
Modern distributed supply chains strive for a high delivery reliability. This reduces
storage costs. The prerequisite is that all components of the supply chain have a high
degree of reliability with regard to quality and availability.
Requirement NFR 4: Lean- and shopfloor-management systems shall be reliable in
terms of availability and result quality.
2.2.3 Summary Requirments for KPI Sharing
Functional and non-functional requirements, such as contextual dependence on processes,
jurisdictions, location, time, organizational structures, roles, as well as performance,
platform independence, secure communication, and reliability, are key components of
privacy-preserving mechanisms for lean- and shopfloor management in distributed supply
chains.
All requirements apply at the same time and must be taken into account dynamically
since they can already be dynamic in themselves.
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2.3 Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing
Process
This section describes requirements based on a scenario3 of entity management in future
dynamic manufacturing processes. The entity term here refers to human resources but
also to other facilities (factory, halls) and equipments (dispensers of protective equip-
ment) or even processes.
2.3.1 General Scenario Settings
Human resources management in real time is a foundation of high quality manufacture
provision. The aim of the scenario is to develop models in order to ensure security
and trust in continuous manufacturing processes. Within the manufacturing processes
the manufacturing chains producing specific products will by defined. The continuity
of the manufacturing processes is ensured if particular positions in the period of time
are assigned according to position definition within the organization structure and the
respective people and other entities assigned in the positions are given respective permis-
sions needed to properly execute their tasks. Filling in the position is further determined
by respective qualification requirements on the position within organization.
Figure 2.2 shows an example setup of the organization structure (entities taking part
in the manufacturing process are listed in Table 2.1). The figure shows a production area
(a factory), which is further divided into several halls. Each hall is used for a specific
manufacturing performed by several workers and observed by a single foreman.
Setup of a Work Shift
The manufacturing process is performed in shifts. A time line of a particular shift is
shown in Figure 2.3 (Table 2.2 list entities taking part in the shift).
Each shift requires a foreman and a given number of workers, each with a certain
skill set. If a particular worker does not arrive in the shift, a replacement can be called
in. However this requires time. As the shift cannot start without all the workers being
present, it is desirable that the foreman is notified in advance if a particular worker is
missing at the workplace before the shift.
If the shift set up needs to be complete at the start (or in defined time in advance) of
the shift activities, we must monitor workers. In the particular shift, we need a single
Foreman-V, four workers VD1-4, working in the hall Hall-1. If we monitor status or
occurrence of individual entities in terms of time and space, e.g. presence in the hall at
time T1, we can expect readiness of the shift 1 at the time T3 when the shift activities
need to begin. If the composition of the entities in the time T1 is not complete the
system generates an inquiry (SMS, email, call) urging the original entity, asking for
confirmation. If the availability is not confirmed then the process replacing the missing
entity by the standby entity is initiated.
3The scenario is based on activities of IMA – co-authors of this paper
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Figure 2.2: Use-Case Overview
2.3.2 Functional Requirements for the Entity Management (EM) Scenario
In Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2, we depicted EM in terms of activities of all the entities.
Based on that we have to make elicitation of use-case requirements in order to ensure
that all activities can be performed with “trust and privacy-preserving emphasizing the
dynamicity” of the activities/processes. On the other hand not all requirements can be
implemented and validated during demonstration because of limited size of the system
and limited number of entities.
Requirement R3 – Trust Model Implementation Validation
When the trust model is invented, the implementation of it has to be validated. The
uneasy implementation should either discourage or block the successful system improve-
ments expected of the model.
Requirement R3: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process should
be easily implementable within identification system at the client.
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Figure 2.3: Shifts sequence in the time line
Requirement R4 – Secure Communication Among Access Control System (ACS)
Components
The ACS platform consists of number of elements which communicate via various in-
terfaces. Each communication channel is a potential weak point where data may be
misused. Secure links are a necessary assumption to build trust model on top of that.
Requirement R4: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
provide secure communication within access control system at the client.
Requirement R5 – Protection of Hardware against Intrusion
In ACSs the sensitive data come usually into existence in the hardware, i.e. readers
or terminals. Sophisticated methods to hack the system aim also at the hardware em-
ploying an untreated defect in the hardware design, e.g. eavesdropping of inter-core
communication or physical connection to ports of microcontrollers.
Requirement R5: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process have to
provide efficient protection of the hardware components against intrusion.
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Requirement R6 – Privacy Awareness within whole EM
This requirement stands on the top and it means that each entity which uses any system
component (computers, mobile, kiosks, work tools, access control readers/gates etc.) is
familiarized how to use it, what kind of data are linked with the component, how to take
care of UI, how to behave in unexpected events.
Requirement R6: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
ensure that each entity which uses any system component is familiarized how to use the
system in regard to privacy awareness.
Requirement R7 – Role-Dependent Privacy
As every entity has a specific role within the system meeting different data (records)
also the attitude towards privacy needs to be different. The foreman obtaining phone
numbers, sending messages has different value of privacy in his/her “hands” then worker
reading product lists involving technical data or failure rates or country of origin.
Requirement R7: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
provide privacy to every entity which is specific to role that entity plays within the system.
Requirement R8 – Location-Dependent Privacy
This requirement is linked to R5, e.g. the foreman has one set of data in his office and
other one when entering the work place handling with products or components. At both
sites the privacy is managed by different way.
Requirement R8: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
provide privacy to every entity which is specific to the location where the entity works
within the system.
Requirement R9 – Enforcing Privacy by Entity Occurrence
If an entity enters a place in the factory from public place or changes the work-places
within the factory then the privacy has to be strongly considered according to presence
in order to prevent intentional/unintentional misusing data about parts, products, tools
or work place.
Requirement R9: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process have to
provide privacy enforcement to the entity if the entity changes the work-places within the
factory.
Requirement R10 – Entities Data Sharing Schedule
This requirement is linked to system configuration (one of management function) where
scheduling of sharing data among entities is crucial functionality. According to schedule
set up for example the foreman may see contacts of assigned workers only several minutes
before the scheduled start of the shift.
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Requirement R10: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process have
to ensure the entity can share or have data at disposal by the schedule at the right time
& place.
Requirement R11 – Issue/Event/Process strictly demarcated by Time Stamps
The requirement is presented in figure 2.3, and expresses strictly when the process begins
and when it ends and thus the system has to control online the fulfillment of the tasks
within individual time windows.
Requirement R11: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process have to
ensure the system can control online the fulfillment of the tasks within set time windows.
Requirement R12 – Non-Redundancy
The system offers to the entity only data absolutely necessary for the single process, e.g.
the system pushes to the foreman the backup workers’ contacts only when the regular
worker is missing and backup entity is being looked for. When a substitute is found the
backup contacts are discarded of the process.
Requirement R12: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
provide or require only absolutely necessary data which belong to specific process or ac-
tivity.
2.3.3 Non-functional Requirements for Entities Management Use Case
Requirement NFR5 – System Performance
This is rather general but very important requirement also connected with scope of the
system. The system will be designed in respect to number of entities, gates, work places,
complexity of the processes etc. The bigger volume of data will be going through the
system the higher performance of the system or system components is required. For
example if number of ID readers at the gates approaching the limit which the master
may technically handle then the number of masters has to be increased. Or if number
of process records is expected extremely high then the capacity of the interfaces needs
to be designed in this regard.
Requirement NFR5: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process have
to provide demanded system performance in order to ensure running of all required pro-
cesses.
Requirement NFR6 – Maintainability
In case a failure of the system we have to ensure prompt fixing of it. If the maintenance
is technically difficult or inaccessible in short time then the reliability of the system is
getting low.
Requirement NFR6: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
allow technically feasible maintenance operation.
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Requirement NFR7 – Comfort, Usability
All system components have to be easily accessible and controllable by workers/foremen.
E.g., if the terminal has a keyboard, display or other kind of user interface then it has
to be directly controllable by a worker/foreman with protection gloves.
Requirement NFR7: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
provide to user a certain level of comfort when he/she handles the system components
as user interfaces, devices and tools.
Requirement NFR8 – Operability
The access control system is composed of number of components. Using these compo-
nents and their functionalities the use case is executed. These components have to be
able to work together to achieve ”common tasks”.
Requirement NFR8: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process have
to ensure an ability of the system components to work together.
Requirement NFR9 – Legal Framework Compliance
Respective contracts need to be clinched. The contracts have to deal with related law
provisions linked to identity, security, data protection etc.
Requirement NFR9: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process shall
be compliant with trust and privacy specific law regulations.
Requirement NFR10 – Reliability, Availability, Serviceability, Manageability
This set of requirements refers four separate but related characteristics of a functioning
system. For our use case we will focus on configuration and control how the services are
available, probability that a component, subsystem or full system, will accomplish its
assigned task within a specified time etc.
Requirement NFR10: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process
shall be developed in order to achieve RASM kind of non-functional behavior within
the whole ACS system.
Requirement NFR11 – Physical Protection
Also connected to R3, the physical (even mechanical) protection, e.g. locked room
or rack, avoids the access to the hardware and safe the hardware against connection
to electronic boards or data interfaces. The reliable mechanical casing of the system
components could be also considered in this requirement.
Requirement NFR11: Entity Management within Dynamic Manufacturing process will
be integrated within the access control system which have to be physically protected in
order to avoid access to the hardware components.
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Table 2.1: Catalogue of entities linked to the model on Figure 2.2 related:
Entity Entity Type
Foreman V Foreman
Foreman M Foreman
Foreman S Foreman
VD1 Worker
VD2 Worker
VD3 Worker
VD4 Worker
VD5 Worker
VD6 Worker
VD7 Worker
VD8 Worker
MD1 Worker
MD2 Worker
MD3 Worker
MD4 Worker
MD5 Worker
MD6 Worker
PZ1 Worker
PZ2 Worker
SK1 Worker
SK2 Worker
SK3 Worker
VZ1 Worker
VZ2 Worker
PO V1 Worker - Standby
PO PZ1 Worker - Standby
PO SK1 Worker - Standby
PO VZ1 Worker - Standby
PO M1 Worker - Standby
Production area Space
Parking1 Space
Parking2 Space
Hall 1 Space
Hall 2 Space
Hall 3 Space
Assembly Process
Manipulation Process
Warehouse Process
T1 Gate
T2 Gate
T3 Gate
T4 Gate
T5 Gate
T6 Gate
Shift 1 Shift
Shift 2 Shift
Shift 3 Shift
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Table 2.2: Relationship to shift
Entity Entity Type
Foreman V Foreman
Shift 1 Shift
Assembly Process
VD1 Worker
VD2 Worker
VD3 Worker
VD4 Worker
PO V1 Worker - Standby
Parking1 Space
T5 Gate
Production area Space
T1 Gate
Hall 1 Space
T2 Gate
18
3 Use Cases
Use cases are a way to define requirements for a system with respect to interactions
between the system and its users. In this section, we describe typical use cases originating
from the domains described above. The use cases are about the whole supply chain
management system and do not only describe access control. This is useful to better
understand the requirements about access control given in Chapter 2 and the according
context information.
The use cases combine both scenarios of KPI sharing and physical access control. This
also covers interactions between these use cases. We use a simplified version of the fully
dressed use case template of Cockburn [7] to describe the use cases.
3.1 Use Case Roles
The following use cases describe their flow of information and involve several roles work-
ing within organisations across the supply chain, on the example of Factory A, B and C.
The use cases follow the reference architecture shown in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. The
following roles apply:
• Worker : the worker operates a machine that transmits sensor data and KPIs. The
worker participates with other workers in shifts overseen by a foreman that last
for a certain period of time at various locations or production lines.
• Foreman: the foreman plans the shift and deals with any incidents that might
occur.
• Factory : factories are part of the supply chain as a suppliers and consumers. If, for
example, Factory A produces a product for Factory B then Factory A is supplier of
Factory B and Factory B is a consumer of the products of Factory A. If Factory C is
a consumer of products from Factory B, then Factory B is a supplier of Factory C.
• Analyst : the analyst performs the lean- and shopfloor-management in each factory
by modelling the factory KPIs and analysing the monitoring results of those KPIs.
• Board : Factory A, Factory B, and Factory C have agreed on using a global supply
chain management system and have accordingly founded a board to carry out
global lean- and shopfloor-management tasks.
• Domain Expert : the domain expert creates models and analyses privacy require-
ments.
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3.2 List of Use Cases
We created 5 use cases. Figure 3.1 shows the actors for every use case and the relation
between the use cases. Entities appearing in the use-cases (plus relations among these
entities) are shown in the domain model in Figure 3.2.
CompaniesSupplier
Foreman Detects Problems on the Shift
Foreman Analyst
Worker
Board Reacts on Low Total First Time Yield
Foreman Reports Problems to the Supplier
Foreman Controls the Shift Assignments
Board
Granting the Worker Access to the Building
Trust 4.0 System
«includes»
Figure 3.1: Use Cases Overview
3.2.1 UC 1: Foreman Detects Problems on the Shift
Scope Assembly Line Production
Preconditions
• The domain expert has defined the process and the restrictions
• The work schedule is available and the restrictions are loaded
• External reports from the supply chain management about bad quality arrived
• The Physical Access Control System (PACS) detected that the foreman accessed
the workplace
Success End Condition The problem in production can be identified.
Failed End Condition The problem in production can not be identified.
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Actors
• Worker
• Foreman
Trigger Factory-System decides the problem is within the production line
Description
1. The Foreman gets information about problem in the production line
2. The Foreman sees the work schedule of her/his workers
3. The Foreman addresses the problem in production
Extensions
2a worker was in the shift with the faulty time at least 5 times:
1. The Foreman sees name of the worker
2. The Foreman addresses the particular worker
Relation to Requirements The following requirements for KPI sharing across supply
chains are reflected in the use case:
• Requirement R1 – Data Sharing: KPIs are transmitted.
• Requirement R2 – Privacy, Requirement R2.1 – Analysis and Predictions, Re-
quirement R2.2 – Legal Framework: Depending on the jurisdiction, only aggre-
gated values that do not allow for inferences about personal data or all data are
transmitted.
• Since the foreman has to be in place and because he only receives information
about the workers in his team, the same requirements are affected as in use case 4.
The following requirements for factory access control are reflected in the use case:
• R6 – Privacy awareness within whole EM
• R7 – Role-dependent privacy
• R9 – Enforcing privacy by Entity occurrence
3.2.2 UC 2: Foreman Reports Problems to the Supplier
Scope Assembly Line Production
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Preconditions
• The domain expert has defined the process and the restrictions
• External product is faulty
• The PACS detected that the foreman and the worker are at their work places
Success End Condition The supplier gets informed
Failed End Condition The supplier does not get informed
Actors
• Worker
• Foreman
• Supplier
Trigger Worker identifies a faulty item used in production
Description
1. The worker informs the foreman about the faulty item
2. The foreman informs the external supplier
Extensions none
Relation to Requirements The following requirements for KPI sharing across supply
chains are reflected in the use case:
• Requirement R1 – Data Sharing: The deterioration of quality is transmitted from
Factory B to Factory A.
• Requirement R2 – Privacy, Requirement R2.3 – Processes: data on the quality of
the process will only be transmitted if the agreed quality is undercut. Otherwise,
the information is confidential.
• Requirement R2.4 – Role, Requirement R2.6 – Time, Requirement R2.7 – Location:
The foreman is allowed to share the information because he has the role of foreman.
He is also at the location of the shift that is in the fault process, and at the time
the fault occurs.
The following requirements for factory access control are reflected in the use case:
• R6 – Privacy awareness within whole EM
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• R7 – Role-dependent privacy
• R8 – Location-dependent privacy
• R11 – Issue/event/process strictly demarcated by time stamps
3.2.3 UC 3: Board Reacts on Low Total First Time Yield
The First Time Yield is the number of good units produced divided by the number of
total units going into the process. It is used in many analysis.
Scope Supply chain management
Preconditions
• The domain expert has defined the process and the restrictions
• Every company calculate the first time yield for its own
• The first time yield is shared with the board
Success End Condition The companies with the two lowest yields are informed
Failed End Condition No company is informed
Actors
• Board
• Analyst
• Companies
Trigger Low First Time Yield is recognized
Description
1. The Board informs the Analyst of the Board about the low yield
2. The Analyst finds the companies with the two lowest yield
3. The Analyst informs the Board about the two companies
4. The Board informs the two companies
Extensions none
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Relation to Requirements The following requirements for KPI sharing across supply
chains are reflected in the use case:
• Requirement R1 – Data Sharing: The initial yield is transmitted to the board.
• Requirement R2 – Privacy: The board transmits information to individual factories
(without informing other factories).
• Requirement R2.1 – Analytics and Predictions: Global analyzes are performed by
the Board.
3.2.4 UC 4: Granting the Worker Access to the Building
Scope Physical Access Control System (PACS)
Preconditions
• The domain expert has defined the process and the restrictions
• The PACS has loaded the process and restrictions
• The PACS detected that the foreman accessed the workplace
Success End Condition Access for worker has been granted
Failed End Condition Access for worker has not been granted
Actors
• Worker
Trigger Arrival phase of shift started (30-45 min before shift)
Description
1. The system notifies the worker on how to access the parts of the compound for the
actual shift.
2. The system grants the worker access to the building
Extensions none
Superordinates UC 5
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Relation to Requirements The following requirements for KPI sharing across supply
chains are reflected in this use case:
• Requirement R1 – Data Sharing: The access control receives data from different
sensors at the access points of the areas of the factory.
• Requirement R2 – Privacy: The foreman does not have access to personal data
• Requirement R2.2 – Legal Framework: Depending on the legal area, the evaluation
of the position of the foreman is not permitted or permitted, because of privacy
rules.
• Requirement R2.3 – Business Process: Depending on which production line is
serviced (and whether the process is normal production - and not, for example, an
incident), the worker has access to different areas.
• Requirement R2.4 – Role: Whether a person has the role of worker or the role of
foreman affects the access and thus the data flow.
• Requirement R2.5 – Organizational Structures: A worker is part of the foreman’s
team. That the roles are based on the organizational structure in this scenario.
• Requirement R2.6 – Time: The shift takes place at a certain time. At other times,
the worker can not enter the designated area.
• Requirement R2.7 – Location: The shift takes place on a specific production line.
This one has a place. Depending on the location of the foreman, access to the area
of the production line may or may not be allowed.
The following requirements for factory access control are reflected in the use case:
• R3 – Trust model implementation validation
• R4 – Secure communication among access control system (ACS)components
• R5 – Protection of hardware against intrusion
• R11 – Issue/event/process strictly demarcated by time stamps
3.2.5 UC 5: Foreman Controls the Shift Assignments
Scope Shift management
Preconditions
• The domain expert has defined the process and the restrictions
• The PACS has loaded the process and restrictions
• Shift assignments are created.
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Success End Condition Shift successfully started, proceeded and ended.
Failed End Condition Shift does not successfully started, proceeded or ended.
Actors
• Worker
• Foreman
Trigger Arrival phase of shift started (45 min before shift)
Description
1. The foreman is at his/her office 45 minutes before the shift
2. Worker is at the factory compound 30 minutes before the shift
3. System verifies this by reading workers location (once the worker is at the com-
pound, the foreman is granted to observe the worker’s time to get to the working
place (this permission is valid till the worker enters the workplace))
4. Worker enters compound (use case 4)
5. Worker uses his/her identity card to obtain protective equipment from the dis-
penser
6. System identifies the worker and gives out the protective equipment
7. Worker comes 10 minutes before the shift start to its working place and stays there
8. System verifies this by reading workers location
9. The foreman observers the workers during the shift
10. Worker leaves the working place in the 10 minute window following the end of the
shift
11. System verifies this by reading workers location
12. Worker uses his/her identity card to exit the hall
13. System identifies the worker and opens the door and signals it is opened
14. Worker is supposed to leave the factory compound by 30 minutes after the shift
ends.
15. System verifies this by reading workers location
16. The foreman leaves her/his place 45 minutes after the shift ends
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Alternatives and Extensions
Alternative for the step 2:
1. Worker is not at the compound 30 minutes before the shift
2. System notifies the foreman and tells the name of the worker plus provides an
estimates how long to get the worker to the compound.
a) Worker is less than 10 minutes far from the compound (guess by a navigation
service)
i. System notifies the worker to “hurry up”
ii. System allows the foreman to see the worker’s travelling time estimate
(access granted for 10 minutes)
A. Alternative here – the worker is not at the compound after 10 minutes
(20 minutes before the shift)
B. GOTO – 2b (call the replacement)
b) Worker is more than 10 minutes far from the compound
i. System notifies the foreman (that the worker is unreachable)
ii. System notifies the worker that he/she is excluded from the shift
iii. System selects a replacement worker (with required capabilities) from the
stand-by workers and notifies the foreman (name and phone no. of the
replacement) and notifies the replacement (place and start of the shift)
iv. System “remembers” the replacement worker
Alternative for the step 7:
1. Worker is not 10 minutes before the shift start at his/her working place
2. System provides the worker’s phone number to the foreman and system grants the
foreman to observe the worker’s exact location
3. Worker is notified to “hurry up”
Extension to the step 9:
1. A worker does not work satisfactorily or there are issues with production
2. The foreman enters issues to the system
Alternative for the step 10:
1. Worker is after 10 minutes still at his/her working place
2. System notifies the foreman and system grants the foreman to observe the worker’s
exact location
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Alternative for the step 14:
1. Worker is after 30 minutes still at the compound
2. System grants the security to observe the worker’s exact location
Subordinate Use Cases Granting the worker access to the building (UC4)
Relation to Requirements The same requirements for KPI sharing across supply
chains as in use case UC 4 are reflected in this use case.
The following requirements for factory access control are reflected in the use case:
• R3 – Trust model
• R6 – Privacy awareness among ACS components
• R7 – Role-dependent privacy
• R8 – Location-dependent privacy
• R9 – Enforcing privacy by entity occurrence
• R10 – Entities data sharing schedule
• R11 – Issue/event/process strictly demarcated by time stamps
• R12 – Non-redundancy
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Employee
name : String
id : Integer
capabilities : Capability
phone : String
national_ID : String
familyStatus : FamilyStatus
reportedLeave : Leave
Capability
<<enumeration>>
list_here
Shift
startsAt
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id : String
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Dispenser
Dispenser
of safery
equipement
0..*
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hall
Entry
1..*
entires
FamilyStatus
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Leave
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1..* workers
RequiredCapability
Figure 3.2: Domain model for use-cases
29
4 State of the Art
During our research we found four main categories of related approaches(Confidentiality
Analyses, Access Control, Enforcement, Data Sensitivity).
4.1 Confidentiality Analyses
Under confidentiality analyses we understand to check, whether a system behave ac-
cording to our privacy [33] rules. One high-level approach for this is Threat Modeling
[28]. It checks coarse-grained the system description for security flaws, in our case for
privacy. Changes in the system architecture are difficult, because threat modeling uses
different models, than architects and developers. In Hoisl et al. [13] the transmissions
in service-oriented architecture design is secured. The approach however only checks for
integrity and confidentiality, it does not have access control integrated. UMLsec [17]
also secures links, in addition it has an access control system integrated. The definition
of these access rules are however defined on the control flow, which is more complicated
to use than on the dataflow. Dataflow analyses like Joana [27] and code verification
approaches such as KeY [1] support the detection of information leaks. Both approaches
need the actual source code and are restricted to specific programming languages like
Java, which is against our Requirement NFR 2.
4.2 Access Control
The classical access control approaches are DAC [31] and MAC [30]. In both approaches
the access right to a file are directly associated with one user. In MAC the file is
additionally secured with a passphrase. Because of the direct association to files, no
group of users exists. Those groups are described as roles. However, Requirement R2.4
requires access based on the role in one organization. The role based access control
RBAC [8] tries to solve this problem. The access rights in RBAC are associated with a
role and not directly with the user. This allows to easily give groups of users permission
for access. This approach was included for example in SecureUML [20]. Here a modeler
specifies roles and permission in an UML class diagram. However, this does not support
dynamic access control, based on other contexts, than roles, for example Requirement
R2.7 could not be modeled. In the Organization based access control (OrBAC) [18]
the context for the access is directly modeled [18]. Because OrBAC does not support
the dynamically joining of different entities, the Coalition-OrBAC approach [3] tries to
solve this. However, the approach still only supports different entities of the same type.
So no joining of completely different entities like an supplier and one manufacturer as
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in Requirement R1 is possible. One other approach is Attribute Based Access Control
(ARBAC) [15]. Here the access is regulated over different Boolean attributes, which
needs to be satisfied, before access to the file can be given. ARBAC does not work on the
dataflow and is so far not integrated into an architectural design. In [29], Thanigaivelan
et al. introduce Context-based Dynamically Reconfigurable Access control (CoDRA).
It provides a dynamic configuration and enforcement of policies allowing for static and
dynamic constraints. However, it misses design time analysis. In [14], the researchers
consider the use of context-aware role-based access control (CARBAC) ontology, which
enhances the response time for access rights. The ontologies provide context-aware rule-
based privacy control, triple level control (i.e. Resource Description Framework - RDF),
and dynamicity in roles. Even though the method supports dynamicity of roles and the
results showed only a small overhead, the paper did not describe composition of the rules
or how the cooperation between different autonomic actors could be performed.
4.3 Enforcement
After declaring the security policies, these must be enforced. Typically a enforcement
platform is used for this. The dynSMAUG framework [19] add this to the ABAC ap-
proach. It manages the policies in both outsourcing and provisioning modes, but it is
still based on events rather than data flow.
Another enforcement platform is MDSE@R [2]. Here aspect orientated programming
allows adding enforcement rules, without changing the original source code. Similarly, [6]
targets preventing security attacks by policy-enforcement for dynamic data-flow track-
ing. More specifically, it uses static analysis for policies and reduces tracking overhead
significantly. In other words, it is compiler-based system that work on source level
to add new policies without changing the compiler itself. Moreover, a framework [24]
captures context and privacy requirements in access control systems. During enforcing
the non-conflicted policies, the security requirements also taken into account. In our
approach we do not want to concentrate too much on enforcement, but rather reuse
existing platforms.
4.4 Data Sensitivity
The privacy and trustworthiness is based on protection of sensitive data. It is crucial to
control data disclosure during data storage, process, and sharing. Basically, the start is
in identifying the sensitive data and to pick the right presentation of it after applying
suitable techniques such as data anonymization or data masking [22].
Anonymization of data as part of trust and privacy preservation is presented in dif-
ferent cases such as [26]. This research addressed data leaks without the need to reveal
the sensitive data for data leak detection (DTD) (i.e. could be also detected by policy
enforcement). The sensitive data is marked by users and anonymized before sending it
to a trusted third party for detection. Nevertheless, it is not clear how the dynamic
context could impact the process, which we require in Requirement R1.
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Similarly, in clouds, [32] presents an algorithm for anonymization before sharing the
data on cloud to prevent data disclosure. It also does not consider the context. Also in
[12], data is protected before sending to the cloud, and the decision of anonymization
is taken by users instead of developers. Even though the flexible access control here is
considered in addition to the trade-off between safety and privacy, requirements such as
prediction Requirement R2.1 and performance Requirement NFR1 are not tackled.
The QoCIM framework [21] analyses the data sensitivity, another important research
field in Industry 4.0. The framework is based on the quality of the data (Quality-of-
Context) analysis. It considers trust, however it is in terms of quality of the meta-
data rather then in terms of confidentiality. Also, data sensitivity is designing dynamic
security that considers environmental risks [10]. Here, the access control for resources
has sensitivity level, time restriction, and groups as security attributes. Nevertheless, it
does not consider confidentiality either.
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5 Envisioned Approach for Trust
Enforcement
The envisioned Trust 4.0 architecture enforces privacy requirements on exchanged infor-
mation regarding multiple business units working across the entire supply chain. Our
suggested architecture builds upon the already presented general architecture for infor-
mation sharing in distributed supply chains in Figure 2.1. The architecture shown in
Figure 5.1 is a concrete instance for supporting the use cases described in Chapter 3.
IMA sensors provide information about the physical location of entities and enforce
physical access control.
Figure 5.1: Bird’s eye view of the Trust 4.0 architecture
The two companies want to share their business data. The data is mostly gathered
from different sensors. An IoT platform gathers sensor data with different protocols and
stores them in its database. In each company, the data can be accessed with the applica-
tion server CAS Open instance. One example of such an access is the ValueStreamer R©.
Every time KPIs or other data shall be shared beyond factory borders, the CAS Open
server uses its synchronization client. This client then asks its TACM 4.0 module,
which regulates the access control within a company. It therefore analyzes the privacy
policies the system’s user have modelled, i.e. the Trust 4.0 Models. The module con-
tains information about a) the structure of information systems as well as about how
information is derived from other information modeled with PCM [23] and a data flow
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extension [25], b) the context relevant for the decision such as geographical location of
entities or roles of entities, and c) rules for data sharing involving the context informa-
tion and the shared data formulated in ensembles [4]. The synchronization client also
manages the synchronisation between the different companies. Therefore it is connected
to the CAS OpenSync module. This module manages the information exchange between
different entities. The synchronisation uses a global ValueStreamer R© instance with a
synchronization client module. The global synchronization client module of the global
instance uses the TACM module to determine, whether information can be exchanged
or not. Figure 5.1 describes which software components in the different business entities
interact across the supply chain:
• ValueStreamer R©: lean- and shopfloor-management tool
• CAS Open instance: basic application server for the ValueStreamer R©
• Sync. client: manages data sharing between instances as well as mapping and
transfer of data objects
• IoT Plattform: manages IoT interfaces and data analytics
• TACM 4.0: connection to the Trust 4.0 Models – PCM and Ensembles; manage-
ment of privacy issues, i.e., this component asks PCM and Ensemble whether to
share an object or not.
• Trust 4.0 Models: PCM and Ensembles governing the access control and data
sharing that the TACM 4.0 enforces
• MQTT and OPC UA: IoT protocols used
Figure 5.2 describes the input and output of the Trust 4.0 models in relation with
the software components involved in the use cases (see Section 3.2). We will describe
Figure 5.2 in the following.
In use case 1, the ValueStreamer R© of Factory C queries its synchronization client and
the TACM 4.0 component (not shown here, see Figure 5.1) whether to share the KPI
quality ration with Factory B. The TACM 4.0 component uses the Trust 4.0 Models to
calculate an answer. If the answer is ‘no’, then no data will be shared. If the answer is
‘yes’, the data will be shared with Factory B. If Factory B receives the data, the local
system will use its local Trust 4.0 Models to calculate, if the data can be given to the
responsible foreman.
In use case 2, the same process is executed between Factory B and Factory A on other
data. The applied principles remain the same.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
Industry 4.0 supply chains are the basis of many products and important for the success
of numerous companies.
Efficiency is essential in order to be successful in nowadays industrial environments.
One way of fostering efficiency is performing global analysis on the distributed supply
chain - often by means of exchanging IoT- or KPI-data (Key Performance Indicator).
This data can be used by lean- and shopfloor management approaches and tools in order
to foster efficiency.
However, globally available information raise trust and privacy concerns. E.g., compa-
nies competing often do not want to share business critical information with each other.
Thus, trust and privacy-preserving mechanisms are a precondition for data exchange
in distributed supply chains. However, this is not easy to achieve: Supply chains in
Industry 4.0 are changing rapidly, new stakeholders have to be taken into account and
leave again from the supply chain.
Privacy policies might depend on legal frameworks, processes, roles, time and place:
privacy policies have to be evaluated in highly dynamic environments and on highly
dynamic parameters.
Our goal is to define a reference architecture that allows for privacy-preserving effi-
ciency analysis in distributed Industry 4.0 supply chains.
Our efforts are bases on the analysis of two real world scenarios from industry part-
ners involved in Industry 4.0 supply chains: (a) Lean- and shopfloor management for
distributed supply chains and (b) factory access control in Industry 4.0. From these
scenarios we have derived requirements and use cases.
We have introduced our use cases in Industry 4.0, concerning privacy and trust mod-
eling. Based on the use cases and requirements, we have searched for existing solutions
and found them being laking mostly the dynamic, necessary for the Industry 4.0 domain.
Because of this, we introduced a reference architecture and our envisioned approach. Our
approach will support the dynamic aspect necessary in Industry 4.0. It will preserve the
privacy of each participant.
Due to the early stage of the project, there are still open questions and future work.
In the future, we want to provide an in depth view of the combination of PCM and
the Ensemble and how they play together to help with dynamic privacy. Here we also
want to research, how to update our internal access models with the new state of the
environment. In our view, this will be the main work in the future. A possible solution
for this could be the integration of iObserve [11], which is combination of runtime and
design time analysis.
For further evaluation the approach will be tested in a real Industry 4.0 system. In
there all the components of our envisioned approach will be applied.
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Without trust - often a result of privacy-preserving mechanisms - data will not be
shared along distributed supply chains. Since meaningful data is the precondition for
global analysis, efficiency can only be achieved with help from privacy-preserving mech-
anisms. Our approach of evaluating and enforcing highly dynamic privacy policies in
distributed supply chains paves the way for efficient industry 4.0 supply chains.
37
Bibliography
[1] Wolfgang Ahrendt et al. Deductive Software Verification – The KeY Book. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2016. isbn: 978-3-319-49811-9 978-3-319-49812-
6. (Visited on 02/22/2018).
[2] Mohamed Almorsy, John Grundy, and Amani S. Ibrahim. “Mdse@ r: model-driven
security engineering at runtime”. In: Cyberspace Safety and Security. Springer,
2012, pp. 279–295.
[3] Iman Ben Abdelkrim et al. “Coalition-OrBAC: An Agent-Based Access Control
Model for Dynamic Coalitions”. In: Trends and Advances in Information Systems
and Technologies. Ed. by A´lvaro Rocha et al. Cham: Springer International Pub-
lishing, 2018, pp. 1060–1070. isbn: 978-3-319-77703-0.
[4] Tomas Bures and et al. “Software Abstractions for Component Interaction in the
Internet of Things”. In: Computer 49.12 (2016), pp. 50–59. issn: 0018-9162.
[5] CAS Software AG and Staufen AG. ValueStreamer. http://www.valuestreamer.
de/en/home/. Accessed: 15.03.2018.
[6] Walter Chang, Brandon Streiff, and Calvin Lin. “Efficient and Extensible Secu-
rity Enforcement Using Dynamic Data Flow Analysis”. In: Proceedings of the 15th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. CCS ’08. Alexan-
dria, Virginia, USA: ACM, 2008, pp. 39–50. isbn: 978-1-59593-810-7. doi: 10.
1145/1455770.1455778. url: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1455770.1455778.
[7] Alistair Cockburn. Writing effective use cases. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2000.
[8] David Ferraiolo, Janet Cugini, and D Richard Kuhn. “Role-based access control
(RBAC): Features and motivations”. In: Proceedings of 11th annual computer se-
curity application conference. 1995, pp. 241–48.
[9] OPC Foundation. OPC Unified Architecture Specification. ”https://opcfoundation.
org/developer-tools/specifications-unified-architecture”. 2008.
[10] M. Fugini, G. Hadjichristofi, and M. Teimourikia. “Dynamic Security Modeling in
Risk Management Using Environmental Knowledge”. In: 2014 IEEE 23rd Interna-
tional WETICE Conference. 2014, pp. 429–434. doi: 10.1109/WETICE.2014.42.
[11] Robert Heinrich. “Architectural run-time models for performance and privacy anal-
ysis in dynamic cloud applications”. In: ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evalu-
ation Review 43.4 (2016), pp. 13–22.
38
[12] Martin Henze et al. “A comprehensive approach to privacy in the cloud-based Inter-
net of Things”. In: Future Generation Computer Systems 56 (2016), pp. 701 –718.
issn: 0167-739X. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2015.09.016. url:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167739X15002964.
[13] Bernhard Hoisl, Stefan Sobernig, and Mark Strembeck. “Modeling and enforcing
secure object flows in process-driven SOAs: an integrated model-driven approach”.
In: Software & Systems Modeling 13.2 (2014), pp. 513–548. issn: 1619-1366, 1619-
1374. (Visited on 02/21/2018).
[14] Shohreh Hosseinzadeh et al. “A Semantic Security Framework and Context-aware
Role-based Access Control Ontology for Smart Spaces”. In: Proceedings of the
International Workshop on Semantic Big Data. SBD ’16. ACM, 2016, 8:1–8:6.
isbn: 978-1-4503-4299-5. doi: 10.1145/2928294.2928300. url: http://doi.
acm.org/10.1145/2928294.2928300.
[15] V. C. Hu, D. R. Kuhn, and D. F. Ferraiolo. “Attribute-Based Access Control”. In:
Computer 48.2 (Feb. 2015), pp. 85–88. issn: 0018-9162. doi: 10.1109/MC.2015.33.
[16] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 20922:2016 Information technology – Message Queuing
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) v3.1.1. ”https : / / www . iso . org / standard /
69466.html”. 2016.
[17] Jan Ju¨rjens. “UMLsec: Extending UML for secure systems development”. In:
UML’02. Springer, 2002, pp. 412–425.
[18] A. A. E. Kalam et al. “Organization based access control”. In: Proceedings POLICY
2003. IEEE 4th International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and
Networks. June 2003, pp. 120–131. doi: 10.1109/POLICY.2003.1206966.
[19] R. Laborde et al. “dynSMAUG: A dynamic security management framework driven
by situations”. In: Proceedings of CSNet’17. Oct. 2017, pp. 1–8.
[20] Torsten Lodderstedt, David Basin, and Ju¨rgen Doser. “SecureUML: A UML-
based modeling language for model-driven security”. In: UML’02. Springer, 2002,
pp. 426–441.
[21] Pierrick Marie et al. “The QoCIM Framework: Concepts and Tools for Quality of
Context Management”. In: Context in Computing: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach
for Modeling the Real World. Ed. by Patrick Bre´zillon and Avelino J. Gonzalez.
New York, NY: Springer New York, 2014, pp. 155–172. isbn: 978-1-4939-1887-4.
[22] Balaji Raghunathan. The Complete Book of Data Anonymization: From Plan-
ning to Implementation. Boston, MA, USA: Auerbach Publications, 2013. isbn:
1439877300, 9781439877302.
[23] Ralf Reussner and et al. Modeling and simulating software architectures: the Pal-
ladio approach. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, Oct. 2016. 377 pp. isbn:
978-0-262-03476-0.
39
[24] A. Samuel et al. “A Framework for Composition and Enforcement of Privacy-
Aware and Context-Driven Authorization Mechanism for Multimedia Big Data”.
In: IEEE Transactions on Multimedia 17.9 (2015), pp. 1484–1494. issn: 1520-9210.
doi: 10.1109/TMM.2015.2458299.
[25] Stephan Seifermann. “Architectural Data Flow Analysis”. In: 13th Working
IEEE/IFIP Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA1´6). Venice, Italy: IEEE,
Apr. 2016, pp. 270–271. doi: 10.1109/WICSA.2016.49.
[26] X. Shu, D. Yao, and E. Bertino. “Privacy-Preserving Detection of Sensitive Data
Exposure”. In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 10.5
(2015), pp. 1092–1103. issn: 1556-6013. doi: 10.1109/TIFS.2015.2398363.
[27] Gregor Snelting et al. “Checking probabilistic noninterference using JOANA”. In:
it-Information Technology 56.6 (2014), pp. 280–287.
[28] Frank Swiderski and Window Snyder. Threat Modeling. Redmond, WA, USA: Mi-
crosoft Press, 2004. isbn: 978-0-7356-1991-3.
[29] Nanda Kumar Thanigaivelan et al. “CoDRA: Context-based dynamically recon-
figurable access control system for android”. In: Journal of Network and Computer
Applications 101 (2018), pp. 1–17.
[30] Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati and Pierangela Samarati. “Mandatory Access
Control Policy (MAC)”. In: Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Ed. by
Henk C. A. van Tilborg and Sushil Jajodia. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011,
pp. 758–758. isbn: 978-1-4419-5906-5. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_822.
url: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_822.
[31] Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati. “Discretionary Access Control Policies (DAC)”.
In: Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Ed. by Henk C. A. van Tilborg and
Sushil Jajodia. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011, pp. 356–358. isbn: 978-1-4419-
5906-5. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_817. url: https://doi.org/10.
1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_817.
[32] J. Wang et al. “Providing privacy preserving in Cloud computing”. In: 3rd In-
ternational Conference on Human System Interaction. 2010, pp. 472–475. doi:
10.1109/HSI.2010.5514526.
[33] Alan F Westin. “Privacy and freedom, atheneum”. In: New York 7 (1967).
40
